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FEDERAL-STATE WATER PROBLEMS
By RAPHAEL J. MOSES*
Continued orderly development of western water resources under
state law is seriously threatened by the federal government's claims to
water rights and jurisdiction over water use. Mr. Moses considers the
power bases which enable the federal government to make such claims,
examining in particular those claims based on the Commerce and
Property Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Under the Commerce Clause
he traces the development of the navigation power and the concomitant
use of the navigation servitude to take property without compensation.
With respect to claims under the Property Clause, he discusses the
federal government's right to waters arising on reserved lands, includ-
ing an analysis of the relevant cases and statutes. He concludes by
commenting on the attempts by state courts to delineate the extent of
federal power and by pointing out the numerous bills which have been
introduced in Congress to resolve the federal-state conflict.
INTRODUCTION
I RIMARILY from the security afforded by state-granted water
ky rights, much of the West has been transformed from the "Great
American Desert" into an economically productive and socially inhabi-
table region. As the Public Land Law Review Commission' stated in
its report to the President:'
In nearly 100 years of development, state water law has achieved
a reasonable certainty of results which has permitted substantial public
and private development in the West. While sometimes necessarily
complex, state administrative and judicial procedures have provided a
means to determine security of rights to the use of water.
3
However, the continued orderly development of the water resources
in the 17 reclamation states4 of the West is seriously threatened by
claims of the United States which cloud the titles of countless numbers
of citizens who have made valid appropriations under state law. As
Floyd Bishop, the State Engineer of Wyoming, stated recently before
the National Water Commission:
One of the most important problems facing the Western States
today relates to the so-called "Reservation Doctrine," and the related
question of jurisdiction over water use and water rights. We feel that
federal claims of reservation of unlimited quantities of water for use
on federal reservations, with a priority as of the date of the reserva-
*A.B. University of Colorado, 1935; L.L.B. University of Colorado, 1937; Chairman,
Western States Water Council, 1966-69.
143 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1969).
2 PUBLIC LAN LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S RESOURCES
(1970).
3 Id. at 142.
4The 17 states usually considered the "West" are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
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tion, create a cloud over state-granted water rights which is intolerable.
Such unquantified reservations would limit future development and
discourage investment in water projects. National Forest Reserves in
Wyoming cover most of the high water producing areas, and these
forests were reserved prior to many of our state-granted water rights.
The potential impact of the Reservation Doctrine on our State is signifi-
cant. At its extreme it could seriously damage existing water users, and
as a minimum it creates a cloud over future water development which
needs to be removed.
Jurisdiction over water resources and the authority to issue rights
for the use of water must be clearly established if we hope to maintain
an orderly system of water administration. Dual jurisdiction simply
cannot work. The states have traditionally accepted and fulfilled this
responsibility and there does not appear to be sufficient reason to
modify this arrangement. 5
The federal claims make it apparent, however, that the United
States does feel a need to modify the traditional arrangement. There-
fore, it will be the purpose of this article to consider the nature of the
claims and discuss the ways in which the federal-state conflict might be
resolved.
I. THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL CLAIMS
The power bases which enable the federal government to claim
a right to regulate water usage within the Western States are derived
from five Constitutional grants of authority: the Welfare,' War,'
and Treaty' Powers; and the Commerce 9 and Property"0 Clauses. While
all are conceivably valid as power bases, the last two are those generally
relied upon in asserting the federal claims and are, therefore, the most
significant.
A. The Commerce Clause"
While the United States was still a young nation, conducting most
of its commerce along its coast and on its navigable rivers, the Supreme
Court held in Gibbons v. Ogden' that control of navigable rivers was
vested in the Congress under the Commerce Clause.' 8 Further, in The
Daniel Ball1 4 the Court more specifically defined the extent of Congres-
5 Hearings Before the National Water Commission, sitting in Denver (1969).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(1).
7 Id. While it might be thought to be strange to relate the use of water to the War Power,
it may be recalled that the Tennessee Valley Authority was originally begun as a project
to provide munitions. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288
(1936).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
9 Id. art. I, § 8(3).
'Old. art. IV, § 3(2).
11id. art. I, § 8(3).
1222 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13Id. at 84. Gibbons declared the proposition that: "All America understands, and has uni-
formly understood, the word 'commerce' to comprehend navigation." Id.
1477 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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sional control and stated what has since been the prevailing rule: All
streams, tidal or fresh water, which are in fact navigable are subject
to the navigation power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.' 5
In discussing the effect of this rule, one commentator has stated that
-[i]f a stream is navigable under this definition, federal power extends
over its entire course, including its non-navigable stretches, and this
power survives commercial disuse, whether for changed economic or
geographical reasons.11
16
Yet the scope of the navigation power has not remained constant,
but rather has been expanded. For example, on the strength of Arizona
v. California,17 it has been stated that "navigable" refers to any stream
which has once been navigable, is navigable, or would be navigable
after reasonable improvements.' 8 Indeed, it has been suggested that
"non-navigable streams which affect the navigable capacity of navigable
streams are subject to the express exercise of the regulatory power."19
Further, it has been held that it is not essential that navigation be the
primary object of any federal program to improve a stream.20 It is
sufficient if navigation is one of the purposes for which the project is
designed.
Hence, the federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause
is extremely broad. As one commentator has accurately summarized:
Navigation has thus ceased to be the measure and limit of federal
power. But, for reasons of history only, navigation remains the basis
and the constitutional touchstone. Once navigation purposes are pres-
ent, Congress may in effect use the waters of both navigable and non-
navigable streams for whatever purposes and in whatever manner it
wishes. In so doing, it can completely override any state water plan.
It can prevent, in toto, state law from being applied to "federal"
waters; or, on a lesser scale, it can prevent state law from being applied
to federal waters in a particular situation where its application conflicts
with the federal interest. Finally, as a matter of comity, it may submit
to state regulation. 21
While it is obvious from the foregoing that the federal claim to
regulate water based on the navigation power can cause serious prob-
lems for the states, an equally egregious aspect of federal power which
has developed from the Commerce Clause is the navigation servitude.
15 Id. at 563.
162 E. MORREALE, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 101.1(A) (R. Clark ed. 1967) (foot-
notes omitted) (hereinafter cited as 2 E. MORREALE].
, 283 U.S. 423 (1931). The Court said: "And the federal government has the power to
create this obstruction in the river for the purpose of improving navigation . Id. at
452.
*82 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 101.1(C).
19 Id.
20 Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 454-56 (1931). The Court stated: "And the fact that
purposes other than navigation will also be served could not invalidate the exercise of the
authority conferred, even if those other purposes would not alone have justified an exer-
cise of Congressional Power." Id. at 456.
?t 2 E. MORREA.E, supra note 16, § 101.2(A) (footnote omitted).
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The navigation servitude is a dominant servitude which allows the
federal government to take, without compensation, private property
rights.22 As stated in United States v. 412.715 Acres of Land:2
In controlling, improving and regulating the navigability of waters the
Government ...may deepen channels, widen streams, erect light-
houses, build bridges, construct dams, and make similar improvements,
without compensating the owners of land subject to the navigation
servitude.2
4
Thus, even though the federal government may be spending vast sums
of money on projects involving navigable waters, it may also be discour-
aging more significant investment by private developers who are wary
of the right of the United States to change conditions on a navigable
stream without compensating those damaged thereby. Even more
serious, however, is the problem which arises when the federal govern-
ment invokes the navigation servitude against an appropriator who
has established a valid appropriation under the state law; for in such
a situation, a valuable property right sanctioned by state law has been
destroyed by a federal law without compensation. And given the wide
scope of the navigation power, the threat of such a situation arising
at any time and on virtually any stream within a state does, indeed,
affect the security of a state-granted water right.
B. The Property Clause
The second major grant of authority under which the federal
government claims a right to regulate the use of water within the states
is the Property Clause which provides that "[tjhe Congress shall have
power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respect-
ing the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and
nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any
claims of the United States, or of any particular state."'25 Based upon
this clause, the argument is made that since all of the land now in the
Western United States at one time belonged to the federal government
(with the exception of Texas), the Western States did not acquire
title to the public lands when they were admitted to the Union; there-
fore, unless the United States has disposed of such lands (and the
water thereon), the federal government is still the owner.26 The
22 The "navigation servitude" is an expression used to describe "[the rule that in the
exercise of the navigation power certain private property rights may be taken without
compensation .... " Id. § 101.3(A). Morreale is careful to point out that the scope of
the navigation servitude is not commensurate with the navigation power as derived from
the commerce power. Id.
23 53 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
2Id. at 148.
25 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3(2). For a discussion of the relationship of the Property Clause
to federal-state water relations, see 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.
2 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.1.
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effect of this argument is to subject nonnavigable waters 7 on public
lands to the far-reaching powers of the Property Clause when those
waters are not validly appropriated under state law.
While a discussion of the effect of certain federal acts on the
question of the disposition of federally-owned waters"s is not within
the scope of this article, the prevalent view29 is that the federal govern-
ment did not dispose of its rights to such waters by the Act of 1866,"
the Act of 1870,"1 or the Desert Land Act of 1877.8
Nevertheless, when the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.8
in 1935, it seemed clear that the states had the right to determine the
terms and conditions upon which individual appropriators would take
title to the waters within the respective state boundaries. The Court
stated:
Second. Nothing we have said is meant to suggest that the act
[the Desert Land Act], as we construe it, has the effect of curtailing
the power of the states affected to legislate in respect of waters and
water rights as they deem wise in the public interest. What we hold is
that following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters
then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the
plenary control of the designated states .. .with the right in each to
determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the
common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain.8 4
Many western lawyers, following the Beaver Portland decision,
assumed that the states had complete control over the appropriation
and use of the waters within their boundaries, subject only to the
equitable apportionment of those waters with the other states through
which such waters might flow. However, the inaccuracy of such an
assumption was manifested by the decision in Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Oregon.85 This case, known as the Pelton case, was the beginning
27 Navigable waters can be subjected to federal appropriation and regulation under the Com-
merce Clause as construed in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963).
2 See generally 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.1. Morreale's argument on this ques-
tion may be summarized thusly:
(a) The Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, permitted states to establish
water rights for severed waters actually put to beneficial use from public lands;
(b) The United States continued to share control of nonnavigable waters;
(c) In appropriation states, the United States remains owner of nonnavigable waters on
public lands subject to displacement by downstream users through valid appropria-
tions under state law;
(d) The United States as landowner may prevent further divestment of its water rights
by withdrawing unappropriated waters from the state appropriation system (under
the Property Clause). Id.
29 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.1.
30 Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253.
3 t Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 218.
32 Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377. The decision in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S.
435, 448 (1955), held that the Desert Land Act did not apply to reserved lands.
33 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
34 Id. at 163-64.
35349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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of a series of cases which clearly declared that the United States had
not, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, divested itself of title to all
of the waters of the West. 6
In Pelton the Federal Power Commission had authorized the
construction of a dam, one abutment of which was located on an Indian
reservation, the other of which was located on a power site with-
drawal. 3 7 Oregon objected to the construction, claiming that no compli-
ance with Oregon law had been effected. The Court rejected this
argument using the same rationale as was used in First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Co-op. v. Federal Power Commission8 which held that it
would be impractical to permit the state to hold veto power over a
federal project.39 The Court said: -[T]o allow Oregon to veto such
use, by requiring the State's additional permission, would result in the
very duplication of regulatory control precluded by the First Iowa
decision.
' 40
Perhaps the real difference between the Beaver Portland and
Pelton cases is that Beaver Portland upheld the right of the states to
regulate the manner in which appropriations could be made from public
lands, whereas Pelton involved reserved lands. In Pelton the Court said:
The purpose of the acts of 1866 and 1870 was governmental recog-
nition and sanction of possessory rights on public lands asserted under
local laws and customs. [citation omitted] The Desert Land Act
severed, for purposes of private acquisition, soil and water rights on
public lands, and provided that such water rights were to be acquired
in the manner provided by the law of the State of location. 41
The Court went on to say that "these Acts are not applicable to the
reserved lands and waters here involved. The Desert Land Act covers
.sources of water supply on the public lands . . . .' The lands before
us in this case are not 'public lands' but 'reservations.'"42
For those who felt, after Pelton, that there was some hope that
the United States did not claim or have authority to claim water for
its reserved lands, the decision in Arizona v. California43 convinced
them that such was not the case. The contentions were raised in Arizona
that the United States did not have power to reserve water on its
36 The Court rejected Oregon's argument that certain federal acts were delegations of power
to the states to regulate the use of federal waters, stating that such acts applied only to
public lands and the lands in question in Pelton were reserved lands. Id. at 443-44.
37 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.4(E) n.44.
38 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
3 Id. at 164. The First Iowa decision involved a navigable stream, while Pelton involved a
nonnavigable stream on reserved lands.
40 Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 445 (1955).
41 Id. at 447 (emphasis by the Court).
421d. at 448.
-373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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reserved lands after Arizona had been admitted to statehood and that
the United States had never intended to reserve water for Indian
reservations. 4 4 Both contentions were rejected, the Court stating: "We
have no doubt about the power of the United States under these clauses
[the Commerce Clause and art. IV, § 3 of the Constitution] to reserve
water rights for its reservations and its property.
' 45
The decisions of Pelton and Arizona offered little comfort to most
of the West since vast quantities of land within the region are covered
by federal reservations, e.g., the national forest reserves. Consequently,
to combat the effect of the decisions, the Western States have raised
the ingenious "equal footing" argument which is based on the proposi-
tion that any new state is entitled to be admitted on an equal footing
with the original 13 states.46 Ergo, since the United States did not
claim waters of the 13 original states as the sovereign, the Western
States should likewise be free of such claims. 47 However, as one
commentator has noted:
Two things are clear. Claims of the United States to unappropri-
ated nonnavigable western waters based on original ownership of the
public domain in no way conflict with the equal-footing clause. While
the court has never expressly said so, the Winters and Pelton Dam
cases clearly imply that claims to such waters are based on proprietary
rather than on sovereign rights of the United States.48
The effect of the early federal legislation, therefore, is apparent.
Beaver Portland was concerned with private rights of private claimants
and did not concern federal ownership or sovereignty; and further,
the case is not authority for the proposition that the Desert Land Act
or earlier legislation effected the wholesale transfer of water or ceded
any property to the Desert Land Act states.49 Perhaps the most that
can be said for Beaver Portland is that it reaffirmed the right of the
states to determine the manner in which private individuals could
obtain property rights in waters on public lands.5" However, there has
been less certainty about the language in Pelton and Arizona. Indeed,
the confusion sparked by those two cases with respect to both the
federal claims and the extent of such claims has resulted in continuing
controversy between the state and federal governments.
42 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.4(F).
45Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963).
46 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, §§ 102.5-.6.
47The argument was raised but not decided in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 611
(1945).
48 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 102.6 (footnote omitted).
49 Id. § 102.7.
50 What Beaver Portland did say was that land taken under a government patent is severed
from the water rights thereon. Hence forward, all nonnavigable waters on patented lands
would "be reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the states and territories




II. RESOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT
There have been several attempts to resolve or at least clarify the
federal-state conflict which arose from Pelton and Arizona. In general,
the attempted resolutions have been proposed by state court adjudica-
tions or by bills introduced in Congress.
A. State Court Adjudication of Federal Water Rights
It can be suggested that the proper place to settle a dispute
concerned with federal and state claims to waters is in court. Efforts at
such adjudication have been attempted numerous times, but have been
generally unsuccessful. 51 A major reason for this lack of success is
that the United States is immune from suit in the absence of its consent.
However, this difficulty was at least partially alleviated in 1952
when Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States by
enacting the so-called McCarran Amendment. 52 The amendment pro-
vided in part:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any
suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights,
where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the
process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law,
by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a
necessary party to such suit.53
The amendment, by its terms, is limited to a water adjudication where
parties seek to settle their water rights as against all other users asserting
a right in a common source. By judicial decision the amendment has
been further limited to deny individual suits against the United States.54
One significant case "5 has been brought in Colorado under the
McCarran Amendment. It involved a recent water adjudication pro-
ceeding in Colorado water district No. 37 (the Colorado River District)
in which the petitioner in a supplemental adjudication proceeding
served the United States with process. The United States appeared and
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that under the
Colorado law only segments of the stream were adjudicated and that
this type of proceeding did not conform to the requirements of the
McCarran Amendment.56 The trial judge overruled the motion to dis-
miss, causing the United States to obtain a temporary writ of prohibition
from the Colorado Supreme Court.
51 For a general discussion of suits against government officers as a means for adjudicating
the federal government's water rights, see 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 106.1.
5 2 Suits for Adjudication of Water Rights, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1964).
53 Id.
54 
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963).
55 See United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) for a statement of
the lower court proceedings.
56 Id. at 762.
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In an opinion delivered by the Colorado Supreme Court, the writ
was quashed. Mr. Justice Groves, in deciding the case, cited Beaver
Portland57 and section 8 of the Reclamation Act58 to support the
court's finding that water rights should be acquired under the provisions
of state law. The court quoted from a report of the Senate Judiciary
Committee which had been written after consideration of a bill contain-
ing provisions similar to those included in the McCarran Amendment.
The report, as adopted by the court, stated:
In the administration of and the adjudication of water rights under
State laws the State courts are vested with the jurisdiction necessary
for the proper and efficient disposition thereof, and by reason of the
interlocking of adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order or
action affecting one right affects all such rights. Accordingly all water
users on a stream, in practically every case, are interested and necessary
parties to any court proceedings. It is apparent that if any water user
claiming to hold such right by reason of the ownership thereof by the
United States or any of its departments is permitted to claim immunity
from suit in, or orders of, a State court, such claims could materially
interfere with the lawful and equitable use of water for beneficial use
by the other water users who are amenable to and bound by the decrees
and orders of the State courts. Unless Congress has removed such
immunity by statutory enactment, the bar of immunity from suit still
remains and any judgment or decree of the State court is ineffective
as to the water right held by the United States. Congress has not
removed the bar of immunity even in its own courts in suits wherein
water rights acquired under State law are drawn in question. The Bill
(S. 18) was introduced for the very purpose of correcting this situation
and the evils growing out of such immunity.5 9
Mr. Justice Groves continued by holding: "Therefore, we conclude
that a proceeding under C.R.S. 1963, 148-9-7 in Water District 37 -
or any other water district - constitutes an adjudication of rights to




59 Senate Calendar No. 711, Report No. 755, Sept. 17, 1951.
60United States v. District Court, 458 P.2d 760, 766 (Colo. 1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S.
1005 (1970). It should be noted that while the court's decision was based upon COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-9-7 (1963), which was repealed by Act of June 7, 1969, ch. 373,
§ 20, (1969] Colo. Sess. Laws 1223, the court was cognizant of new legislation (COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 et req. (Supp. 1969)). As was stated in the case:
Senate Bill 81 adopted in 1969 [citation omitted] was approved after the briefs
were filed in this proceeding and prior to oral argument. Following oral argument
the United States and the City and County of Denver filed supplemental briefs on
the subject of the effect of this Act upon the questions involved, if any. Since the
district court did not have this matter before it, we deem it the better part of wisdom
to await its determination with respect to this matter. We do make the observation
that some or all of the parties in Water District 37, as well as in similar proceedings
in other parts of the state which have been held in abeyance awaiting this opinion,
may conclude that the provisions of the 1969 Act are more suitable than the pre-
existing statutes for adjudications involving the United States.




There still remains the troublesome problem concerning joining,
in a supplemental adjudication proceeding, all persons whose rights
might be affected by the claims of the United States. Although the
Colorado Supreme Court expressed confidence in the ability of the dis-
trict court to resolve this matter, it provided no opinion of its own.61
B. Bills Introduced in Congress
There have been a number of bills introduced into the Congress
which have attempted to deal with water rights claimed by the United
States vis-a-vis state rights. The first of these was the so-called "Barrett
Bill,"62 introduced in 1956. This bill failed to pass. Similarly, there
was introduced in 1959 the so-called "Agency Bill, '" 3 a compromise
proposal which attempted to meet the fears aroused by the Pelton
decision by providing that "rtfhe withdrawal or reservation of surveyed
or unsurveyed public lands, heretofore or hereafter established, shall
not affect any right to the use of water acquired pursuant to state law
either before or after the establishment of such withdrawal or reser-
vation.'"4 Incorporated in the Agency Bill was an amendment which
would have supported the equal footing argument.6 5 It has been specu-
lated that the bill failed to pass because of executive opposition to this
amendment.66
In 1965 Senator Kuchel of California sponsored a bill 7 which
would have had the effect of preventing any reservation from impairing
any right to the use of navigable or nonnavigable water acquired
pursuant to state law either
(1) before the establishment of such withdrawal or reservation, or
(2) after the establishment of such withdrawal or reservation unless,
in the latter event, a Federal statute, or an officer of the United States
authorized to make such a withdrawal or reservation, shall have pro-
mulgated the purpose, quantity, and priority date of the water right
reserved to the United States or otherwise established under its own
laws, and such promulgation shall have antedated the initiation of the
conflicting right under state law.6 8
This provision, although far from perfect, would have alleviated some
of the uncertainties clouding present property rights to the use of water
in the Western States, because it would have required the Federal
61 ld. at 767.
62S. REP. No. 863, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
63 See 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 107.1 n. 96.
64 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 13 (1959).
65 See text accompanying notes 45 & 46, supra.
6 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 107.1.
67 S. REp. No. 1636, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
68 Id. For a comprehensive discussion of S. 1636, see 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 107.2.
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agencies to quantify their needs in connection with reservations. With
the defeat of Senator Kuchel, however, Congress took no action on the
bill."9
In 1967, a bill substantially similar to the Senator Kuchel proposal
was introduced into the Senate70 and was followed by a similar bill
introduced in the House in 1969.71 Affirmative action was not taken
on either of these bills, and none appears planned for the immediate
future.
Congressman Aspinall of Colorado had indicated that the House
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee would not hold hearings on
such bills until the Public Land Law Review Commission makes its
report. Now that the report has been issued,72 it remains to be seen
whether the recommendations contained therein will be adopted or
whether water appropriators in the Western States will be forced to
continue to wait for a resolution of the federal-state conflict.
CONCLUSION
The federal government's control of navigable waters under
the Commerce Clause and its claims to water rights under the Property
Clause have created an atmosphere of uncertainty which threatens to
impede the further orderly development of the water resources of the
Western States. While state courts have attempted to delineate the extent
of federal power and numerous bills have been introduced in Congress
which seek to resolve the federal-state conflict and remove the cloud
which hangs over the rights of those who own state granted water
rights, none of these measures have been successful. Perhaps the report
of the Public Land Law Review Commission and the recommendations
contained therein will provide the compromise measure which will
not only allow a modicum of dual sovereignty but will also define the
respective power limitations.
APPENDIX*
THE IMPLIED RESERVATION DOCTRINE OF FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS
As successor to the sovereigns from which the United States
obtained the vast areas of the western public domain, the Federal Gov-
ernment by the mid-19th century possessed complete power over the
land and water of that region. Because the courts have settled the issue,
69 2 E. MORREALE, supra note 16, § 107.2.
7o S. REP. No. 2530, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
71 H.R. REP. No. 476, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
72The section of the report of the Public Land Law Review Commission dealing with the
federal-state conflict is set out in toto in the APPENDIX, at 204 infra.
*This APPENDiX is a portion of the chapter on Water Resources reprinted from the recent
report of the Public Land Review Commission. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMIS-
SION, ONE THUD OF THE NATION'S RESOURCES 141-49 (1970).
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there is little to be gained in academic arguments as to whether that
power derives from concepts of "ownership" as distinguished from
"sovereignty": the power is plenary, whatever its conceptual basis.
By a series of acts in 1866, 1870, and 1877,1 when Federal policy
stressed the disposition of the public domain under the homestead,
public sale, and other settlement and disposal laws, Congress provided
that such Federal land disposals would not carry with them an accom-
panying water right. Rather, the water on the public lands was declared
open to use, and property rights to its use were to be obtained under
the laws and customs of the states and territories. As to lands retained
in Federal ownership, there were none of the public land manasem.ent
programs we know today requiring water use on Federal lands by t'-e
Federal Government or its agents, e.g., mineral leasing operations,
recreation facility management, fish and wildlife protection and habitat
enhancement, and so forth. Accordingly, the Federal Government did
not then have to face up to whether it would comply with state water
laws.
By the turn of the century, the Federal Government had started
reserving public lands from disposition by setting aside national forests
and parks, creating wildlife refuges, and making large-scale withdrawals
for other purposes. With respect to the water needs associated with
programs on these lands, the usual practice during the first half of this
century was for permittees, licensees, etc., to acquire necessary water
rights under state law in accordance with the policy stated in the 1866,
1870, and 1877 acts. The Federal agencies generally followed that
same practice for their program needs.
In the 11 western states the predominant water right system is
the law of prior appropriation, which was adopted as being most suit-
able to a water-short region. Under this system prior use establishes
priority of right, and nonuse for prescribed periods will cause a for-
feiture. In times of shortage, uses are curtailed in inverse order of their
priorities. The riparian law of water rights2 which prevailed in the
more humid eastern states was rejected as unsuitable. Its principal vice
was that an upstream riparian owner could do nothing indefinitely
while his neighbor downstream put water to use and became dependent
thereon, yet at any time the upper riparian could assert his equal right
and destroy or impair the effort and investment of his neighbor.
An appropriative water right may be acquired only for a beneficial
purpose, and even if the proposed type of use is beneficial under state
' The relevant portions of the acts are codified as 43 U.S.C. §§ 321, 661 (1964).
2 The riparian system has three major features, all of which are the antithesis of the appro-
priation doctrine. First, water may be used only by a riparian landowner, on riparian land,
and within the natural drainage basin of the stream from which it is taken. Second, it is




law, it must usually also be a reasonable use in the light of other
demands for water. While there are diversities among the water laws
of these states, they are generally consistent in recognizing, by statute
or decision, domestic and municipal purposes, irrigation, mining, power,
and manufacturing, as well as other similar uses, as beneficial.
Although the decided court cases indicate that there is no serious
problem in obtaining rights for recreation and fish and wildlife conser-
vation, several of these states do not expressly specify such uses as
beneficial in their water statutes.
Nearly all state appropriative water laws also establish a system
of preferences under which certain beneficial uses are preferred over
others. In most of these 11 states, domestic, stock-watering, and munici-
pal uses appear to have preferred status over irrigation, and irrigation
is preferred over all the remaining uses. Recreation and fish and
wildlife uses are not preferred uses in these states. This has caused
concern that Federal program needs, particularly for fish and wildlife,
may not be fully served if the Federal Government must rely on these
state laws. However, while problems for Federal agencies may yet
develop because of state laws relating to beneficial use or preferences,
none has been brought to our attention.
In nearly 100 years of development, state water law has achieved
a reasonable certainty of results which has permitted substantial public
and private development in the West. While sometimes necessarily
complex, state administrative and judicial procedures have provided
a means to determine security of rights to the use of water.
However, in 1955, the Supreme Court in the Pelton Dam decision'
indicated that the withdrawal or reservation of Federal lands for
specified purposes also reserved rights to use water on such lands, even
though the legislative or executive action made no mention of water
or its use. Under this doctrine such reserved water rights would carry
a priority as of the date of the reservation or withdrawal of the lands.
Although the possible consequences of the decision that state law
need not control the acquisition of water rights for such "reserved"
lands were disturbing to many in the western public lands states, under
the facts of the case the Pelton Dam decision itself did not require
infringement of water rights previously vested under state law. The
limits and impact of the newly enunciated application of the reser-
vation doctrine were left uncertain. However, some of the Federal
agencies began to rely on this doctrine for water rights in addition to
their customary compliance with state law.
In 1963, any lingering doubts about most of the implications of
the reservation doctrine as a source of water rights were removed in
3 Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California.4 By analogy to
earlier Indian cases, and in partial reliance on the Pelton Dam decision,
the Court sustained the conclusions of its Special Master in that case
that certain reservations of public domain land for particular purposes,
i.e., wildlife refuges, a national forest, and a national recreation area,
carried with them an "implied" reservation of sufficient unappropri-
ated water to satisfy the reasonable requirements of those reservations
without regard to the provisions of state law.
Since then, the Forest Service and the military departments have
indicated that they will no longer comply with state law in acquiring
rights for the use of water on reserved lands, and will rely on Federal
claims arising out of the reservation or withdrawal of the public lands
they administer. Other Federal agencies, such as the National Park
Service, still have a policy of compliance with state appropriation
procedures, but whether this will continue is uncertain.
The result has been apprehension in the western public land states
that the doctrine will have the effect of disrupting established water
right priority systems and destroying, without compensation, water
rights considered to have vested under state law. Moreover, the uncer-
tainty generated by the doctrine is an impediment to sound coordinated
planning for future water resources development.
Legislative proposals that Congress either affirm, abolish, or
clarify the reservation doctrine have been the subject of numerous
hearings and discussions during the last decade, but Congress has
taken no action on the matter. The issue has been one of the most
controversial before the Commission.
The Commission gave much attention to the question of whether
this controversy might be only a doctrinal legal argument with little
substantive impact. We conclude it has substance.
Although most of the current concern relates to the doctrine's
potential future impact, such potential impacts could be major.5 This
would be particularly likely on specific streams or systems where water
is now virtually completely appropriated under state law.
We recommend legislative action to dispel the uncertainty which
the implied reservation doctrine has produced and to provide the basis
for cooperative water resources development planning between the
Federal Government and the public land states.
The reservation doctrine has several advantages for the Federal
Government. (1) As reservation needs develop, uses under it can
expand indefinitely without regard to state water law requirements
4 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
5 Even though Federal departments and agencies were requested to estimate future water
needs for the use in our contract water study, the estimates provided were obviously
rough, not all-encompassing, and, therefore, unconvincing. We also note that the needs
expressed could not be considered as maximums.
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that water be put to beneficial use within a reasonable time. (2) Vast
reserves created around the turn of the century carry advantageous
early priority dates vis-a-vis state-determined priorities. (3) The Federal
Government need not pay any compensation for divested non-Federal
rights initiated after the date of the withdrawal or reservation, however
long the water may have been beneficially used. (4) The Federal use
need not be "beneficial" under state law if it is within the scope of
the purposes for which the reservation or withdrawal was created.
While the advantages of the reservation concept to Federal
agencies are apparent, there are problems which must also be considered
from the Federal standpoint. (1) In Arizona v. California6 the Master
required some evidence of intent for each land reservation before he
would sustain an implied reservation of water. It is not clear whether
such an intent would be implied for all reservations and withdrawals,
although to date it appears this should ordinarily be no problem if
water is essential to the express purposes of the reservation. (2) There
is some doubt whether any use will be implied other than those
expressly stated at the time of withdrawal. (3) It appears that where
the purpose of a withdrawal or reservation is changed, the priority
date of the new use will be the date of the use change and not that
of the earlier use. (4) Without litigation or agreement it is not possible
to determine what the maximum permissible amount of water would
be for any given use. In Arizona v. California, for example, the amount
allowed for irrigation uses was based on irrigable acreage and then
current Bureau of the Budget standards of economic feasibility. The
effect of future changes in feasibility standards is uncertain. (5) It is
not clear what the physical relationship of the reserved land must be
to the source of the water supply, i.e., whether a reservation right is
available for land outside the natural watershed of the river system
from which the water would be drawn. (6) It is not clear whether
acquisition of a state appropriative right by the Federal Government
or its lessees, licensees, and permittees has the effect of waiving any
reservation right to additional water for that particular use. (7) It has
not been determined whether termination of a land withdrawal or
reservation also terminates the reserved water right, even when the
particular use continues thereafter.
Limitation of Reservation Doctrine
Recommendation 56: The implied reservation doctrine of water rights
for federally reserved lands should be clarified and limited by Congress
in at least four ways: (a) amounts of water claimed, both surface and
underground, should be formally established; (b) procedures for con-
testing each claim should be provided; (c) water requirements for
future reservations should be expressly reserved; and (d) compensation
6 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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should be awarded where interference results with daims valid under
state law before the decision in Arizona v. California.
Although state law appears to be generally adequate as a basis
for water rights for uses on reserved public lands, the reservation
doctrine should not be abrogated. To do so and to require the public
land agencies to rely solely on state law for the acquisition of water
rights for reserved land uses presents several problems:
(1) In some states important Federal uses, such as for recreation
or fish and wildlife purposes, are either not recognized as beneficial
uses or have low preferences vis-a-vis other competing uses.
(2) The implied reservation doctrine provides the necessary water
rights for certain Federal uses and future needs for which state law
has not been complied with for one reason or another. To discard the
reservation doctrine might well place the validity of those rights in
question and inject further uncertainty into this area.
Nevertheless, the implied reservation doctrine as announced and
applied in Arizona v. California7 has created many problems. Numerous
unanswered questions about its scope and impact remain. The two
most important questions which Congress should resolve, however,
center on (1) the uncertainty which the doctrine has engendered, and
(2) the equity of holders of water rights vested under state law, whose
rights may be curtailed without compensation through its strict appli-
cation. Solutions of these two critical problems will permit reliance
on the reservation doctrine where necessary to assure adequate Federal
water rights for the reserved public lands, and at the same time minimize
disruption to existing state administrative machinery, promote more
effective water resources planning, and provide equitable treatment
to holders of water rights vested under state laws. Consequently, we
recommend that Congress take the following legislative actions:
(1) Provide a reasonable period of time within which Federal
land agencies must ascertain and give public notice of their projected
water requirements for the next 40 years for reserved areas, and forbid
the assertion of a reservation claim for any quantity or use not included
within such public notice.
Some Federal agencies, in particular the Forest Service, are
endeavoring to refine their data on present uses and future require-
ments and to provide such information to state water authorities.
However, there is nothing in the present legal system which requires
this or makes such quantification binding on the agencies, and they
would be free to enlarge these projections in the future as they deem fit.
Most of the present uncertainties should be removed by requiring
a binding quantification and delineation of Federal claims, particularly




missible purposes and places of use, etc. These determinations might
be made as part of the review of existing land withdrawals which we
recommend elsewhere in this report, although a shorter time period
for this effort seems desirable. In those cases where it seems likely
that existing uses on reserved lands will increase to significantly larger
estimated future requirements at a relatively modest rate over the
40-year period, Congress may wish to provide a means for the agencies
to permit interim use of reserved water until it is needed for Federal
purposes. This would promote maximum beneficial use of water and
could be done through formal arrangements with the states.
(2) Establish a procedure for administrative or judicial determi-
nation of the reasonableness of the quantity claimed, or the validity
of the proposed use under present law.
This would give an opportunity for timely contest by present
users or appropriate state agencies of the quantity or legality of the
use, such as whether the use is properly implied from the creation of
the withdrawal or reservation. At the present time there is no procedure
for doing this.
There is no effective judicial machinery to permit the resolution
of the many issues raised by the reservation doctrine, even if a case-by-
case approach to its clarification and refinement were desirable, and
we do not believe that it is. Although the United States is free to
initiate such a suit, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars such
actions by non-Federal water users or state administrative agencies
unless Congress has consented to such a suit. The McCarran Act,8
which on its face consents to certain kinds of water adjudications, is
an unsatisfactory vehicle for obtaining definition of Federal reserva-
tion claims. The courts have held that all water users on a river system
must be joined under that Act,' and this is not always possible or
feasible. Moreover, the issue of whether the McCarran Act permits
adjudication only of rights held under state law and not of Federal
reserved rights, as the Department of Justice contends, is now before
the United States Supreme Court.1°
Although we elsewhere recommend that Congress provide for
judicial review of public land decisions by aggrieved parties, we are
not prepared to go that far with respect to all Federal water right
questions. Not only are the questions more complex, but they go far
beyond this Commission's jurisdiction, since they usually affect multiple-
purpose project developments having little or no public land connection
and are best dealt with by the National Water Commission. However,
8 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1964).
9 Miller v. Jennings, 243 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 827 (1957).




we do recommend provision for judicial review of at least the limited
questions of the reasonableness of the quantity claimed under the
reservation doctrine, its priority date, and the purposes for which the
reserved water may be used.
(3) Provide that procedures for creation of future withdrawals
and reservations require, as a condition to claims of reserved water
rights, a statement of prospective water requirements and an express
reservation of such quantity of unappropriated water.
This would have the effect of requiring an administrative or
legislative review of these claims and substitution of express water
rights reservations for potential implied claims. Coupled with the
previous recommendation concerning existing reserved rights, most of
the uncertainty generated by the reservation concept should be elimi-
nated.
(4) Require compensation to be paid where the utilization of the
implied reservation doctrine interferes with uses under water rights
vested under state law prior to the 1963 decision in Arizona v.
California.
When reliance is placed on Federal water rights impliedly reserved
along with the reservation or withdrawal of public lands, the effect
may be to displace, without compensation, other non-Federal public
and private uses under water rights acquired under state law subsequent
to the date when the water was impliedly reserved for the Federal
lands, but prior to the date the water was actually put to use by the
Federal agencies. This is the principal vice of the doctrine from the
viewpoint of individual water users. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Arizona v. California in 1963, no water user could
have been on actual or constructive notice of the existence of such
an "implied" Federal water right. The same is true of the state
administrative agencies, since as a matter of formal policy and actual
practice, the public land agencies generally adhered to state law in
acquiring water rights for reserved lands prior to 1963.
As a practical matter, use of the doctrine to cause actual injury
to water rights vested under state law without compensation has been
rare to date, and the likely future impact is uncertain. However, as a
matter of policy Congress has generally provided in the Reclamation
Act of 1902" and the Federal Power Act of 192012 that compensation
be provided to holders of water rights vested under state law when
they are interfered with by projects authorized or licensed under those
two acts. We find no reason for a different policy where public land
programs are involved. As a matter of fairness and equity, it is appro-
11 43 U.S.C. §§ 371 et seq. (1964).
12 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825 (1964).
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priate to compensate holders of vested state water rights whose uses
are curtailed through Federal reliance on the implied reservation
doctrine. We believe that the potential costs to the Federal Government
would be relatively low. In any event, the social costs of displacing
existing uses for the benefit of national programs should be borne by
the Federal taxpayers, and not by the affected individual users.
